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Financial Sector De-regulation in Emerging Asia: 
Focus on Foreign Bank Entry  
 






Over the last decade, many emerging Asian economies have been liberalising their financial 
sectors,  including opening up their banking systems to foreign competition. This paper 
examines the extent of de jure and de facto changes in policies in selected emerging Asian 
economies on the introduction of greater foreign competition. For reasons of data availability, 
the focus of this paper is limited to selected emerging Asian economies, viz. India, China, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
 
One of the immediate motivations for undertaking the policy of greater external openness in 
many of these countries was the much-needed funds that foreign investors might bring in to 
help recapitalise the banking systems following the Asian crisis of 1997-98.  Beyond the 
financing issues,  however,  it is becoming increasingly apparent that foreign competition 
tends to bring with it additional benefits that may not be likely in the case of domestic 
competition.  
 
Among the key regulatory changes that have taken place in many of the Asian economies 
pertaining to foreign bank entry was the amendment of rules governing foreign equity limits 
in the domestic banking sector. While Indonesia,  South  Korea and Thailand raised their 
foreign ownership limits quite aggressively, others such as India, China and Malaysia have 
taken a far more gradualist approach.  
 
While much of Asia has taken important,  although not uniform,  steps in opening up its 
banking systems to foreign competition, available data on bank assets, loans, deposits and the 
like offers some indicative evidence that countries such as Indonesia and South Korea have 
experienced increased penetration of foreign banks into their domestic markets. However, it 
is striking that most of Asia continues to lag behind other emerging markets in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The relatively low penetration of banks into Asia is 
consistent with the fact that while Asian economies have been deregulating their banking 
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systems, they have approached this process more cautiously than their counterparts in Eastern 
Europe or Latin America.  
 
Apart from parochial protectionist arguments, there are some valid concerns regarding the 
internationalisation of the banking sector. This said, many of the concerns regarding foreign 
bank entry are arguably more to do with the timing and pace of the deregulation process as 
well as the mistaken belief that foreign bank entry is synonymous with capital account 
deregulation. The evidence that a high share of foreign bank ownership may lead to a greater 
likelihood of foreign shocks being transmitted domestically and, thus, may be a source of 
added vulnerability is mixed at best and more careful work needs to be done on this topic.  
   3 
1.  Introduction  
 
Over the last decade many emerging Asian economies have been liberalising their financial 
sectors,  including opening up their banking systems to foreign competition.  One of  the 
immediate motivations for undertaking this policy in countries such as  Indonesia,  South 
Korea and Thailand was the much-needed funds that foreign investors might bring in to help 
recapitalise the banking systems following the Asian crisis of 1997-98. Beyond the financing 
issues, however, it is becoming increasingly apparent that foreign competition tends to bring 
with it additional benefits that may not be likely in the case of domestic competition.  
 
First, there is a growing body of empirical evidence highlighting the benefits of foreign bank 
entry in emerging economies by way of reductions in cost structures,  improvements in 
operational efficiency,  introduction and application of new technologies and banking 
products, marketing skills and management and corporate governance structures.
2
 
 In relation 
to this, foreign banks could enhance the quality of human capital in the domestic banking 
system by importing high-skilled personnel to work in the local host subsidiary as well as via 
knowledge spillovers to local employees. Customers should in turn benefit in terms of being 
able to access new financial services. 
Second, bank internationalisation may create domestic pressures for local banking authorities 
in the host countries to enhance and eventually harmonise regulatory and supervisory 




   
Third,  the  entry of foreign banks ought to reduce the extent of “non-commercial”  or 
“connected”  lending as these banks are not as politically connected as the home-grown 




Fourth, opening up the domestic banking sector to foreign participation might encourage 
some of the local banks to venture overseas to compensate for the loss of domestic revenue 
sources, or more generally because they have learnt from the experiences of their foreign 
competitors who have entered the local market. Thus,  as Singapore’s domestic banking 
system has become more internationalised since 1997-98, local banks in Singapore have both 
consolidated their operations while also aggressively expanded their operations overseas and 
have been active participants in cross-border mergers and takeovers. Singapore banks, for 
instance,  have purchased significant stakes in banks in India,  Hong Kong,  Thailand,  the 
Philippines and Indonesia, just to name a few.
5 Similarly, India’s largest bank, the State Bank 
of India (SBI), has been aggressively establishing ventures overseas in recent years just as the 
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Fifth, a banking system with an internationally diversified asset base may be more likely to 
be stable and less crisis-prone. There is evidence, for instance, that the foreign bank branches 
have lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios than the  domestic banks in South  Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand.
7 In addition, the domestic branches of foreign banks may be able to 
obtain financing from the foreign head office which could act as a private lender of last resort 
during a period of financial stress.
8  This said,  it is important to ensure that foreign 
investments do not largely originate from a single home country as this might increase rather 




(However, recent lessons of experience have given policymakers and observers some reason 
to revisit this oft-noted  advantage  of foreign bank entry; we return to this issue in the 
following sections). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 respectively examine the 
extent of de jure and de facto policies in Asia with regard to the introduction of greater 
foreign competition. While there has clearly been increased  international financial 
liberalisation in the region, Asia lags behind emerging Europe and Latin America when it 
comes to the relative significance of foreign banks in their respective domestic economies. 
Section 4 discusses Asia’s relatively cautious approach towards this policy. Section 5 
concludes the paper. An annex lists the top 10 foreign investors in selected Asian economies. 
For reasons of data availability, the focus of this paper is limited to selected emerging Asian 





2.  De Jure Openness of Asian Banking Systems  
 
Several Asian economies have witnessed crucial regulatory changes in their financial sectors 
since the Asian financial crisis. Most of these countries have come up with specific blueprints 
for restructuring their respective banking and financial sectors. While the details of these 
reforms obviously vary between countries, one of the central elements of the restructuring 
plans common to all these nations has been the move to ease the entry norms for foreign 
banks, although the timing and pace has varied quite considerably. One of the key regulatory 
changes that took place pertaining to foreign bank entry was the amendment of rules 
governing foreign equity limits in the domestic banking sector. These were dramatically 
altered in some of the hard-hit countries after the crisis. While countries such as Indonesia, 
South Korea and Thailand raised their foreign ownership limits quite aggressively, others 
such as Malaysia took a more gradualist approach. Table 1 presents a snapshot view of the 
key regulatory changes that have taken place in Asia between 1998 and 2008. We discuss a 
few details below. 
 
2.1  The Enthusiastic Liberalisers: Indonesia,  South  Korea,  Thailand and the 
Philippines 
 
Indonesia, by virtue of being the hardest-hit due to the Asian crisis, was quite proactive in 
undertaking full-fledged restructuring of its- financial sector following the economic crunch. 
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The first step was to address the problems in the domestic banking system, which was done 
by setting up the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) in January 1998 to oversee 
mass consolidations of the badly-hit domestic banks and also to deal with the issue of NPLs 
in state and private banks. In addition, the more significant regulatory change occurred when 
a new banking law came into existence in November 1998 that relaxed the restrictions on 
foreign participation in the country’s domestic banking industry. The key elements of that 
law included permitting foreign banks to take over Indonesian banks and investing in unlisted 
and listed banks, subject to some restrictions,
11
 
 allowing foreign non-bank institutions to 
purchase Indonesian banks and removing restrictions on the expansion of the branches of 
foreign joint-venture banks. This move also allowed the IBRA to sell off the local banks that 
were nationalised (in order to prevent them from completely collapsing) during the crisis to 
the foreign firms. This ‘divestation programme’ has yielded the desired results as the country 
has seen a tremendous growth in the foreign ownership in the national banking system. 
Foreign banks in Indonesia constitute a sizeable presence in terms of their number. By the 
end of 2005,  there were about 37 banks which  could be classified as foreign banks in 
Indonesia, of which 11 were foreign bank branches, 17 were joint ventures and nine were 
foreign acquired banks. This said, the definition of a foreign bank does not include private 
national banks which also have significant foreign ownership stakes. While foreign bank 
subsidiaries and foreign bank branches are not governed by different regulations, no new 
licenses  are being  granted to either of the two,  although the already established foreign 
branches and joint  venture banks are allowed to open one additional sub-branch and an 
additional office in the country.  
During the restructuring process  in the post-crisis  period,  the  South  Korean government 
pursued a policy of encouraging the entry of foreign banks and thereby easing most of the 
regulatory obstacles that stood in their way.  In 1998, the Financial Supervisory Commission 
(FSC) was established to oversee the  restructuring of the  financial sector and the FSC 
recognised the need for foreign participation to assist the country in the process of 
recapitalisation and enhance the efficiency of the banking system. If foreign ownership of 
domestic commercial banks exceeded 10, 25 and 33 percent successively, it would require 
approval. Apart from allowing for greater foreign ownership, foreign banks have also been 
allowed to establish subsidiaries in the country. An interesting point worth noting is that the 
modified banking law in 1998 resulted predominantly in easing foreign investment through 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in South Korean banks rather than through the opening of 
foreign bank branches. Notwithstanding an initial spurt in overseas foreign banks in the South 
Korean market immediately after the crisis, it was only after 2004 that the foreign bank entry 
through branches resumed in a significant way, and by the end of 2008 there were 39 foreign 
bank branches in South Korea (Kim, 2005). This said, it is key to note that the local foreign 
bank branches are still governed by some stringent regulations that limit the participation of 
wholly foreign-owned banks in South Korea.  
 
Thailand is the other aggressive liberaliser. The most important regulatory reform following 
the 1997-98 crisis was to allow 100 percent foreign ownership of the domestic financial 
institutions for a 10-year period, after which the foreign banks would not be able to take up 
additional equity unless they held less than 49 percent of equity. This ruling assumed more 
prominence mainly because of the severe restrictions that are in place for the foreign banks to 
gain market access through establishing branches. The Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) 
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introduced in 2004 allows foreign banks to apply for two types of licenses. The first option is 
for a foreign bank to be a subsidiary whereby it enjoys the same scope of business as a 
commercial bank and is also allowed to open one branch within Bangkok and three branches 
elsewhere in Thailand. The second option is to apply for a full branch of a foreign bank, 
which has the same scope of business as a commercial bank but is not allowed to open any 
branches. The minimum capital requirement is higher for a branch than a subsidiary. Foreign 
banks with majority shareholdings in Thai commercial banks are also allowed (so-called 
hybrid banks). As of February 2009, Thailand had three hybrid banks, 16 foreign branch 
banks and 24 foreign banks that maintain representative offices. 
 
While the Philippines has not been nearly as aggressive as the other three economies, it has 
undergone a substantial restructuring of its banking system following the crisis. Similar to its 
neighbours, in 2000, the general banking act was amended to facilitate the entry of foreign 
banks. This also resulted in a favourable policy change towards encouraging significant 
cross-border M&A in the financial sector. Foreign banks were allowed to acquire a 100 
percent stake until end April 2007, after which the ownership cap reverted to 60 percent.  
 




The case of China seems to be very different when compared to the experiences of other 
countries in the region. China has been a late entrant in the Asian region to open up its 
banking sector for foreign participation. While most of the other Asian economies undertook 
more aggressive domestic liberalisation than what they have been offered under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (noted below), most of the recent developments 
with respect to foreign bank operations in China have been primarily driven by obligations 
arising from China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Although 
there was a multilateral commitment for a phased expansion of foreign bank access since the 
end of 2006 (Leigh and Podpiera, 2006), the penetration level of foreign banks in China 
remains very small and even insignificant to some extent, as the larger issue of complicated 
regulatory requirements still remains.  
 
While the direct participation of foreign banks as either branches or subsidiaries in the 
Chinese banking system is insignificant,  indirect participation as investors with minority 
stakes has been gaining considerable popularity in the recent years (Leigh and Podpiera, 
2006). Since 2003 the maximum share a single foreign investor may take in a local bank had 
been raised to 20 percent. The overall maximum foreign shareholding is set at 25 percent. 
There were about 70 banks with minority stakes in Chinese banks and close to 200 foreign 
banks had opened representative offices in China as of the end of 2007. The regulations 
governing the establishment of foreign banks remain quite stringent compared to those of the 
other countries in the region. Only those foreign commercial banks that have maintained a 
representative office in China for at least two years prior to the application, and have total 
assets of not less than US$10 billion at the end of the year preceding the application, can 
apply for establishment of a wholly foreign-funded bank (subsidiary). The same asset 
requirement applies for the establishment of a Chinese foreign joint-venture bank and the 
asset requirement is even higher for the establishment of a branch. Foreign banks are 
encouraged to have local incorporation. Those banks that do not incorporate locally will be 
barred from accepting individual deposits of less than RMB 1 million, (in a way severely 
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limiting the scope of their business). As of the  end  of  2007,  24 foreign banks had 
incorporated locally  and a total of 25 Chinese commercial banks had entered into 
partnerships with foreign investors. 
 
The liberalisation of financial services in India has been gradually picking up pace since the 
early 1990s. Compared to China, India’s regulatory environment has been reasonably liberal 
since then and in some cases more favourable to foreign banks than the domestic banks, 
which is in sharp contrast with the other countries in the region. For instance, there is no 
discriminatory treatment between a foreign bank and a domestic bank as far as the banking 
operations are concerned. A foreign bank can undertake all the activities permitted to an 
Indian bank, including both retail and wholesale banking business. In addition, there exists 
some form of a positive discrimination favouring foreign banks with regards to the priority 
sector lending requirements. Foreign banks are required to lend only 32 percent of net credit 
to priority sectors, as against the 40 percent requirement for the Indian banks. The domestic 
banks also have a sub-ceiling with respect to agricultural advances as a part of priority sector 
lending, which is not applicable to foreign banks. Export credits that are granted by foreign 
banks would be adjusted towards the priority sector lending obligation, something that is not 
available for the Indian banks. Importantly, foreign banks are now allowed to access the 
Indian market not only through branches but also as wholly owned subsidiaries. This was a 
significant component of the blueprint pertaining to widening the presence of foreign banks 
in the Indian market.
13
 
 Aggregate foreign investment in private domestic banks identified by 
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) for restructuring has been revised to 74 percent. 
3.   Penetration Rates of Foreign Banks in Asia   
 
Overall, we see that much of Asia has taken important – although by no means uniform – 
steps in opening up their banking systems to foreign competition. But to what extent have 
these regulatory changes translated into actual or de facto changes?  
 
The evidence regarding the number and share of foreign banks in the domestic economy is 
somewhat counter-intuitive in that the number of foreign banks appear to have gone down in 
most of the countries (except the Philippines) despite the various regulations designed to ease 
the entry norms for foreign banks (Table 2). However, this has largely been due to major 
consolidations and domestic restructuring among local banks. More insight can be derived by  
examining the market share of foreign banks in terms of assets and liabilities. Table 3 offers 
some indicative evidence by providing the extent of penetration of foreign banks with respect 




The levels of foreign bank penetration have increased dramatically in Indonesia and South 
Korea in particular,  but also Thailand and the Philippines to a somewhat lesser extent, 
especially in the case of foreign bank share of domestic assets. Not surprisingly,  the 
penetration levels of foreign banks in China’s domestic banking industry remained 
insignificant with just a 2.3 percent share of total banking assets at the end of 2007, although 
up from close to zero in 1997. India and Malaysia are interesting cases. As Table 3 indicates, 
there was no substantial change in the market share of foreign bank assets and deposits pre- 
and post-crisis in both these countries. In fact, the share of deposits of the foreign banks has 
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that of foreign bank deposits.    8 
actually declined in both the countries, although marginally. This appears to largely be due to 
a rapid rise in the presence of private domestic commercial banks which have captured 
market shares from national banks as well as foreign banks. 
 
In Malaysia,  the restrictions on foreign participation in its banking sector were largely 
maintained in the post-crisis period. The share of foreign bank assets in Malaysia improved 
marginally from 21.6 percent in 1997 to about 23 percent in 2008 while those of deposits 
remained stagnant. As Table 4 highlights,  private domestic commercial banks controlled 
nearly 78 percent of the banking assets and deposits in the country during the time of the 
crisis and this structure of the Malaysian banking system has largely continued to remain so 
even a decade after the Asian crisis. Given the overwhelming significance of private domestic 
banks  as compared to foreign banks,  mainly arising out of a favourable policy by the 
government to encourage domestic consolidation and privatisation, it was difficult for foreign 
banks to expand their presence in Malaysia.  
 
While India’s regulatory policies seem to provide a conducive environment for the entry and 
operation of foreign banks, the significance of foreign banks in the domestic banking industry 
has actually been declining since 1997. The concomitant rise in the private sector banks in the 
country and the already existing state owned banks appear to be outpacing the foreign bank 
entry. Specifically, the number of foreign banks operating in India has actually declined from 
42 during 1997-98 to about 29 in 2007. While this was partly due to mergers between the 
Indian branches of foreign banks, there were also closures of some foreign banks in this 
period. As in Malaysia, domestic consolidations and privatisations were favoured to allowing 
foreign bank entry per se. Thus, the share of foreign bank assets in the total commercial 
banking assets stood at nearly 8 percent in 2007, almost on par with the levels during the 
1997 financial crisis, while that of deposits declined from about seven percent during 1997 to 
around 5.8 percent in 2008. On the other hand, as shown in Table 4, the significance of 
private sector banks has been growing steadily since 1997 and they accounted for nearly 22 
percent of the banking assets at the end of 2007, up from about 10 percent in 1997. The same 
trend holds good for deposits and the shares of deposits held by the private banks expanded 
significantly in the post-crisis period from about 8 to 20 percent in 2007.   
 
It is instructive to note here that the multilateral commitments of almost all these economies 
have been bound at lower levels than what has been liberalised autonomously. For instance, 
India’s multilateral commitments at the WTO in the banking sector came into force soon after 
the Asian financial crisis (1997-98) and the obligations concerning issuing of new licenses 
for foreign bank entry were limited to 12. Also, as per the commitments, India could deny 
issuances of new licenses to foreign banks if their share of assets (including both on and off 
balance sheet items) exceed 15 percent. However, in reality, the RBI has been far more 
liberal in granting entry for more foreign banks than the levels committed at the multilateral 
level, and it has also not denied licenses to any new foreign bank using the WTO provisions 
to-date. The foreign equity limits have also been raised autonomously to 74 percent  as 
opposed to the 49 percent that was bound in the revised offers. These instances indicate that 
the multilateral commitments have actually lagged behind the autonomous liberalisation 
measures taken with respect to foreign bank entry.  
 
4.  Asia’s Continued Anxieties with Foreign Bank Entry 
 
To sum up, while foreign banks have made some inroads into emerging Asia, especially 
Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, the extent of penetration of foreign banks into Asia as   9 
a whole has been relatively low compared to that of Central and Eastern European, and Latin 
American countries. For instance, a recent report by the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS) made the following observation: 
 
One of the features that differentiates Asia from other emerging market 
economies is the limited degree of foreign participation in the domestic 
banking sector...(T)he share of foreign bank assets in Asia,  at about 10 
percent, is far smaller than 33 percent in Latin America and over 50 percent in 
Eastern Europe. In Latin America and Eastern Europe, a series of “mega” 
takeovers have led to a significant foreign bank presence in many countries, 
frequently with a large portion of the banking system owned by foreign 
institutions. The average size of cross-border financial sector M&A deals 
during the last five years was around US$40 million in Asia, considerably 
smaller than that of around US$187 million in Latin America. This mostly 
reflects the fact that in Asia, many takeovers were either purchases of small 





While Asian economies have been deregulating their banking systems for reasons noted 
above, they have, as a group, approached this process somewhat more cautiously than their 
East European or Latin American counterparts. Part of this caution may be attributable to the 
continued presence of a strong anti-foreign bank lobby in some Asian countries. While some 
of the criticisms are misplaced and part of a larger “globophobia” phenomenon, there are 




For some time,  the conventional wisdom has been that a banking system with an 
internationally diversified asset base may be more likely to be stable and less crisis-prone. 
There is evidence, for instance, that the foreign bank branches have lower NPL ratios than 
domestic banks in South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. In addition, the domestic branches of 
foreign banks may be able to obtain financing from the foreign head office which could act as 
a private lender of last resort during a period of financial stress. A growing concern is that 
foreign banks might be a source of instability and contagion rather than stability. This 
appears to have been the case in the recent global financial crisis which hit the Eastern 
European financial system much harder than it has the relatively more closed and regulated 
Asian financial system. Does foreign bank entry, or more broadly, internationalisation of the 
financial sector, make the country prone to international capital booms and reversals? Many 
casual observers of financial liberalisation fail to make a distinction between “capital account 
deregulation” (such an external borrowing), on the one hand, and “internationalisation of the 
financial sector”, on the other. The latter is broadly defined as the elimination of barriers to 
entry and discriminatory treatment of foreign competition and cross-border provision of 
financial services.  
 
The nexus between international capital flows and financial services may be succinctly and 
effectively captured by Table 5. Cell I on the uppermost left-hand corner refers to the case of 
financial autarky, that is, neither financial services trade nor an open capital account. Cell IV 
                                                 
15   The Committee on the Global Financial System is a central bank forum established by the Governors of the 
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survey of Asian financial systems post-crisis. 
16   This section builds upon Rajan and Gopalan (2009).   10 
on the bottom right-hand  side  denotes the case of “complete”  international financial 
liberalisation, that is, liberal capital account and bank internationalisation. The remaining two 
cells may be broadly classified as “partial international financial liberalisation”. Specifically, 
Cell II involves the case of bank internationalisation with capital restrictions; while Cell III is 
the case of capital account deregulation but with restrictions on trade in banking services 
maintained (for example, foreign bank loans). Of course, in reality, matters are not nearly as 
simple; the two elements of international financial liberalisation are closely intertwined and 





The GATS recognises the right of countries to maintain sovereignty over prudential and 
related regulations of all financial firms resident in the country, including capital account 
controls. It is more likely that capital account in the forms of foreign bank lending makes a 
country relatively more crisis-prone than when a foreign bank establishes a separate entity in 
the host country,  and  lends  domestically,  especially in the form of a fully independent 
subsidiary (as opposed to a branch or representative office). This said, much more research is 
needed on the relative costs and benefits of branches versus subsidiaries, the latter being 
relatively independent from the parent.
18
 
  For instance,  are the former more likely to be 
supported by their parent in the event of a crisis in the host country but also more likely to 
“cut-and-run” in the event of a crisis in the source country or a global crisis? While research 
on the mode of bank lending is scant, one would also expect that domestic lending via an 
onshore foreign bank would more likely be in domestic currency, while offshore lending 
would be in foreign currency (such as the United States dollars), hence leaving the country 
comparatively more vulnerable to currency mismatches and financial crisis (that is, negative 
balance sheet effects).  
Beyond this, the other broad economic justifications for continued protection of the domestic 
banking system boil down to the usual “infant industry” and “strategic” industry arguments. 
The first essentially argues that time is needed for domestic bank consolidation if local banks 
are to be able to compete effectively against multinational foreign banks which have much 
larger and more diversified capital bases. The second maintains that the financial sector, with 
its intricate linkages to the rest of the economy, is “too important to be left in the hands of 
foreigners”.  
 
While the infant industry argument has merit in theory, as is usually the case, the problem in 
practice is that most infants take too long to grow up, and many a time they grow old rather 
than grow up. The other problem with infant industries is that, since they form a dependency 
on the state to protect them all the time from threats, it makes them become fairly inefficient 
and it is usually the consumer who usually loses out at the end. With regard to the strategic 
industry argument, one could turn it on its head and suggest that, in view of the importance of 
the banking and overall financial sector to the rest of the economy and society, everything 
possible must be done to ensure it is as efficient as possible, and that includes welcoming 
foreign bank participation. In any event, as with most other industries, the infant and strategic 
                                                 
17  For a discussion of the nexus between foreign bank entry and capital account regulation, see Kono and 
Schuknecht (1999) and Tamirisa (1999). The latter study finds that while financial service liberalisation in 
general has insignificant effects on capital inflows, different modes of entry and different types of financial 
services (for example, banks versus insurance) could have differential effects on capital flows. There is 
evidence that the former inevitably leads to de facto weakening of capital controls. For some evidence of this 
in the case of China, see Liu (2005). 
18   See Clarke et al., (2003) and World Bank (2008).   11 
industry arguments appear more valid as grounds for moderating the pace and possibly even 
the extent of foreign bank entry, rather than opposing the policy in its entirety. From the 
regulators perspective,  any form of financial services liberalisation requires that the 
institutional and regulatory environment be fortified before and during the process of 
liberalisation. Liberalisation in a weak or ineffective regulatory and supervisory environment 
can be calamitous. This was made abundantly clear by the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 which 
was partly caused by the ill-timed and ill-sequenced liberalisation of the financial sector. This 
is an important reason to favour introducing competition in a phased and nuanced manner.  
 
There are other reasons for a gradual as opposed to a “cold turkey” or “big bang” approach to 
bank internationalisation. The long sheltered and coddled local banking sector usually needs 
some “breathing space” and lead time to prepare for the impending competition. This in turn 
necessitates a broad consolidation of many of the hitherto relatively weak and small banks 
and non-bank financial institutions via mergers or takeovers. Without this, apart from outright 
closures of some smaller and inefficient banks,  remaining domestic banks may opt for 
increasingly risky and speculative investments to compensate for declining market shares, 
lower profit margins and eroding franchise values. If such “gambling for redemption” occurs, 
an increase in bad loans due to risky investments will partially offset the efficiency gains 
associated with greater international competition. In addition, foreign banks may, in some 
instances, be in a position to engage in “cherry picking”, that is, being able to choose clients 
or  debtors of the  highest quality and leaving the domestic banks to serve lower quality 
borrowers. There is some evidence that this has been happening in some Asian countries such 




This said, the danger of a gradualist approach to internationalisation is that it may eventually 
“run out of steam” as opponents of the program will have more opportunities to block it. Lest 
there be any wavering of commitment by Asian policy makers towards  bank 
internationalisation, it is imperative to keep in mind that what matters for growth and welfare 
is the availability of high quality products and services at internationally competitive prices, 
not who provides them. It warrants repeating that the need for efficiency in banking services 
is paramount as it is a key input in all other sectors of the economy. This point needs to be 
reinforced in Asia where, despite noteworthy steps having been taken to lower barriers and 
encourage foreign participation in their domestic banking sectors,  the region’s banking 
sectors remains somewhat less internationalised than their counterparts in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe. Indeed, many Asian countries, especially China and India, are only at the 
early stages of internationalising their banking and financial systems. 
 
One outstanding concern of the deregulation of  the domestic banking system which  has 
gained greater credence recently is that it could weaken the ability of the central bank to use 
“moral suasion”  in times of crisis. For instance,  the ongoing financial crisis has made 
apparent the lack of effectiveness of conventional monetary policy, due in part to the fact that 
liquidity infusions by many central banks into the domestic financial system have remained 
clogged up without being passed on to the real economy in terms of bank lending (hence 
resulting in a sharp decline in the money multiplier). However, this has been somewhat less 
of a problem in some Asian economies such as India and China, where large public sector 
dominated banks (de facto or de jure) such as the central banks, have been able to “cajole” 
                                                 
19   For Korea, see Kim and Lee (2004). For India, see Gormley (2006).    12 





5.  Conclusion 
 
The evidence of efficiency and related gains to be reaped from foreign bank entry is fairly 
strong. This has motivated a number of emerging economies to welcome foreign banks into 
the domestic economy. While Asian banking systems have become more internationalised 
over the last decade since the 1997-98 crisis, they still remain relatively closed compared to 
their Eastern European and Latin American counterparts. As discussed above, many of the 
concerns of foreign bank entry are arguably more to do with the timing and pace of the 
deregulation process as well as the mistaken belief that foreign bank entry is synonymous 
with capital account deregulation. The evidence that a high share of foreign bank ownership 
may lead to a greater likelihood of foreign shocks to be transmitted domestically and thus be 
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Table 1: Key Regulatory Changes Concerning Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Asia 
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Source: Authors’ compilations based on the following documents - EIU Country Finance Reports (various 
years), East Asia Analytical Unit Report (1999), Marchetti (2009) and Pasadilla (2008).       17 
Table 2: Number of Foreign Banks in Emerging Asia 
 
Country  During the Crisis (1997)
1  Post-crisis (Latest Year 
Available)
2 
Indonesia  44  37 (2005) 
Malaysia  14  13 (2008) 
Thailand  21  16 (2008) 
Philippines  13  22 (2008) 
South Korea  68 (1998)
3  36 (2007) 
China  NA  71 (2007) 
India  42  29 (2007) 
Notes:  In addition to branches and subsidiaries, foreign banks here include minority stakes, joint ventures, etc. 
Figures in Parentheses denote the latest available year for that country.   
  NA – Not Available 
Source:    1 Taken from Chua (2003). 
2 Compiled from the EIU Country Finance Reports.  
3 Based on Oh and Park (1998). 
 
 
Table 3: Share of Bank Assets and Deposits in  
Emerging Asia by Foreign Banks with Majority Ownership 
 
Share of Banking Assets ( percent)  Share of Banking Deposits ( percent) 
Countries  1997
1  2007-08
2  1997  2007-08
 





4  23 (2008)  21.1
4  20.8
4 (2008) 
Thailand  7.1  12.6 (2008)  2.9
4  7.8
4 (2008) 
Philippines  8.5  13.2 (2007)  NA  NA 
South Korea  2.2  15.7 (2008)  3.8
5  10
5 (2002) 
China  0.1  2.3 (2007)  NA  NA 
India
6  7.9
  8.4 (2008)  7  5.8 (2008) 
Note:  A bank is defined as foreign if it includes over 50 percent of shares.      
Figures in Parentheses denote the latest available year for that country. 
   NA – Not Available. 
Source:  1 Unless and otherwise mentioned, all the banking assets data for the year 1997 is based on Cull and 
Peria (2007).  
2 Unless and otherwise mentioned, all the data available for 2007-08 is based on EIU Country Finance 
Reports, latest available year.  
3 Based on the following link http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/09/10/editorial-foreignowned-
banks.html. 
4 Data compiled from central banks documents.   
5 Data based on Kim and Lee (2004).  
6 Data on India compiled from the RBI’s documents; Prasad and Rao (2005).  
 
             18 
Table 4: Domestic Private Commercial Bank Assets and Deposits in India and Malaysia 
 
  India  Malaysia 
  Share of 
Banking Assets 
(percent) 






Share of Banking 
Deposits (percent) 
1997-98  10.1  8.3  78.8  78.1 
2007-08  21.7
1  20.3
1  76.9  79.1 




Table 5: Domestic versus International Capital Flows and Bank Internationalisation 
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Source: Kono and Schuknecht (1999) 
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21   Unless and otherwise mentioned, the top ten foreign-controlled banks in the individual countries are ranked 
in terms of their assets.  
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Top Ten Foreign Banks in Korea by Country of Origin, 2005
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Top Ten Foreign Banks in Philippines by Country of Origin, 2008 








Taiwan, 1   21 
                  
           Note: Top 10 foreign banks in India are ranked by advances in fiscal year 2006/07. 
 
                








          Note: Top ten foreign banks in China are ranked by the number of employees as on June 2008. 









Top Ten Foreign Banks in India by Country of Origin, 2007 
Singapore, 1 
US, 3 
UK, 2 
Japan, 1 
Canada, 1 
Netherlands, 1 
France, 1 